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Abstract
We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over
infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a
current action profile such that at new action profile all the players from the coalition are
strictly benefited. Such deviations define a coalitional better-response (CBR) dynamics that
is in general stochastic. The CBR dynamics either converges to a K-stable equilibrium or
becomes stuck in a closed cycle. We also assume that at each time a selected coalition makes
mistake in deviation with small probability that add mutations (perturbations) into CBR
dynamics. We prove that all K-stable equilibria and all action profiles from closed cycles,
that have minimum stochastic potential, are stochastically stable. Similar statement holds
for strict K-stable equilibrium. We apply the CBR dynamics to study the dynamic formation
of the networks in the presence of mutations. Under the CBR dynamics all strongly stable
networks and closed cycles of networks are stochastically stable.
Keywords— Strong Nash equilibrium, Coalitional better-response, Stochastic stability, Net-
work formation games, Strongly stable networks.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is most desirable solution concept in non-cooperative game theory. When
a strategic game is played repeatedly over infinite horizon then the Nash equilibrium that is
played in the long run depends on an initial action profile as well as the way all the players
choose their actions at each time. Several discrete time dynamics have been studied in the
literature to study the Nash equilibrium selection in the long run. Young [27] considered an n
players strategic game where at each time all the players make a simultaneous move and each
player chooses an action that is the best response to k previous games among the m, k ≤ m, most
recent games in the past. In general this dynamics need not converge to a Nash equilibrium, it
may stuck into a closed cycle. Young [27] also considered the case where at each time with small
probability each player makes mistake and chooses some non-optimal action. These mistakes
add mutations into the dynamics. In general the mutations can be sufficiently small. This leads
to the definition of stability of Nash equilibrium as mutations vanish. This type of stability is
called stochastic stability. Young proposed an algorithm to compute the stochastically stable
Nash equilibria. For 2×2 coordination games he showed that the risk dominant Nash equilibrium
is stochastically stable. Kandori et al. [18] considered a different dynamic model where at each
∗The authors’ names are given in alphabetic order.
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time each player plays with every other player in pairwise contest. The pairwise contest is given
by 2× 2 symmetric matrix game and each player chooses an action which has higher expected
average payoff. The mutations are present into dynamics due to wrong actions taken by the
players. For 2 × 2 coordination games they showed that a risk dominant Nash equilibrium is
stochastically stable. That is, for 2× 2 coordination games the dynamics given by [27] and [18]
selects the same Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg et al. [10] proposed a dynamics where at each
time only one player is selected to choose actions. The mutations with small probability also
occur at each time. The risk dominant Nash equilibrium in 2× 2 coordination games need not
be stochastically stable under this dynamics.
The Nash equilibrium concept is inadequate for the situations where players can a priori
communicate, being in a position to form a coalition and jointly deviate in a coordinated way.
To capture such situations (strict) K-stable equilibrium [26] is an adequate solution concept,
where K is a set of all feasible coalitions. When there is no restriction on coalition formation,
(strict) K-stable equilibrium corresponds to (strict) strong Nash equilibrium [1]. As motivated
from the application of K-stable equilibria in network formation games considered in [7, 14, 13]
we restrict ourselves to only pure actions. A K-stable equilibrium need not always exist and in
such case there exist some set of action profiles forming a closed cycle such that it is possible to
reach from one action profile to another via sequence of improving deviations by the coalitions;
and it is not possible to reach an action profile outside of the closed cycle from an action profile
belonging to closed cycle via improving deviations by the coalitions.
Recently, some stochastic dynamics involving the coalition formation among players have
been proposed [4, 21, 26]. Sawa [26] studied the stochastic stability in general finite games
where the mutations are present through a logit choice rule. Newton [21] considers the situation
where profitable coalitional deviations are given greater importance than unprofitable single
player deviations. Avrachenkov et al. [4] considered a variant of network formation game and
discuss the stochastic stability of the networks when the networks are formed dynamically, in the
presence of mutations, over infinite horizon. In general, the stochastic stability results depend
on the way actions being chosen during the infinite play. Some other famous works on stochastic
stability in different settings include [8, 9, 10, 22, 23, 11, 25, 20, 24].
In this paper we propose a new stochastic dynamics due to the coalition formation in a
strategic game over infinite horizon. We call our dynamics a coalitional better-response (CBR)
dynamics where at each time players are allowed to form a coalition and make a joint deviation
from the current action profile if it is strictly beneficial for all the members of the coalition.
We assume that the coalition formation is random and at each time only one coalition can be
formed among all feasible coalitions. We also consider the situation where at each time a selected
coalition makes wrong decision with small probability, i.e., it moves to an action profile where
all the players from the coalition are not strictly benefited. These mistakes work as mutations
and add perturbations into CBR dynamics. We prove that the perturbed CBR dynamics selects
K-stable equilibria or closed cycles, that has minimum stochastic potential among all action
profiles, in the long run as mutations vanish. If there is no restriction on coalition formation,
CBR dynamics selects all the strong Nash equilibria and closed cycles, i.e., all the strong Nash
equilibria and closed cycles are stochastically stable. The similar CBR dynamics can be given
for the case where each time a coalition deviate from a current action profile such that all the
players from the coalition are at least as well off at new action profile and at least one player is
strictly better off. In this case the similar results hold for strict K-stable equilibrium and strict
strong Nash equilibrium (SSNE). Our CBR dynamics can be applied to network formation games
which shows that all the strongly stable networks and closed cycles of networks are stochastically
stable. Our CBR dynamics generalizes the stochastic dynamics considered in [4] by considering
the general finite games. The stochastic dynamics for pairwise stable networks considered in
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[15] can also be viewed as a special case of our CBR dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model and few definitions. We
describe the CBR dynamics in Section 3. We conclude our paper in Section 4.
2 The Model
We consider an n-player strategic game. Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a finite set of players, and Ai
be a finite set of actions of player i whose element is denoted by ai. We denote A =
∏n
i=1Ai as
a set of all action profiles and a = (a1, a2, · · · , an) denotes an element of A. The payoff function
of player i is defined as ui : A → R. We consider settings where players may form a coalition
and jointly revise their strategies. In many situations it may not be feasible to form all types
of coalitions. Let K ⊆ P(N) \ φ be the set of all feasible coalitions, where P(N) denotes the
power set of N and φ an empty set. For a coalition S ∈ K, define AS =
∏
i∈S Ai whose element
is denoted by aS and a−S denotes an action profile of players outside S. A coalition of players
jointly deviate from a current action profile if at new action profile each player from the coalition
is strictly benefited. Such a deviation leads to the definition of K-stable equilibrium. In some
cases, a coalition of players jointly deviate from a current action profile if new action profile
makes each player at least as well off and one player strictly better off. Such a deviation leads
to the definition of strict K-stable equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. An action profile a∗ is said to be a K-stable equilibrium if there is no S ∈ K
and a ∈ A such that
1. ai = a
∗
i , ∀ i /∈ S.
2. ui(a) > ui(a
∗), ∀ i ∈ S.
If K = P(N) \φ, a K-stable equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) [1]. Let A(S, a)
be the set of all action profiles reachable from a via deviation of coalition S. It is defined as,
A(S, a) = {a′|a′i = ai, ∀ i /∈ S and a′i ∈ Ai, ∀ i ∈ S}.
A coalition always has option to do nothing, so a ∈ A(S, a). Let I1(S, a) be a set of improved
action profiles reachable from an action profile a via deviation of coalition S, i.e.,
I1(S, a) = {a′|a′i = ai, ∀ i /∈ S and ui(a′) > ui(a), ∀ i ∈ S}. (1)
For an improved action profile a′ ∈ I1(S, a), an action profile a′S of all the players from S is
called a better-response of coalition S against a fixed action profile a−S of the players outside S.
Define, I1(S, a) = A(S, a) \ I1(S, a) as a set of all action profiles due to the erroneous decisions
of coalition S. It is clear that a ∈ I1(S, a), i.e., I1(S, a) is always nonempty for all S and a. A
K-stable equilibrium need not always exist. In such a case there exist a set of action profiles lying
on a closed cycle and all such action profiles can be reached from each other via an improving
path. The definitions of closed cycle and improving path are as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Improving Path). An improving path from a to a′ is a sequence of action profiles
and coalitions a1, S1, a
2, · · · , am−1, Sm−1, am such that a1 = a, am = a′ and ak+1 ∈ I1(Sk, ak)
for all k = 1, 2, · · · ,m− 1.
Definition 2.3 (Cycles). A set of action profiles C form a cycle if for any a ∈ C and a′ ∈ C
there exists an improving path connecting a and a′. A cycle is said to be a closed cycle if no
action profile in C lies on an improving path leading to an action profile that is not in C.
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Theorem 2.4. There always exists a K-stable equilibrium or a closed cycle of action profiles,
or both K-stable equilibrium and closed cycle.
Proof. An action profile is a K-stable equilibrium if and only if it is not possible for any feasible
coalition from set K to make an improving deviation from it to another action profile. So, start
at an action profile. Either it is K-stable equilibrium or there exists a coalition that can make
an improving deviation to another action profile. In the first case result is established. For the
second case the same thing holds, i.e., either this new action profile is a K-stable equilibrium or
there exists a coalition that can make an improving deviation to another action profile. Given
the finite number of action profiles, the above process either finds an action profile which is a
K-stable equilibrium or it reaches to one of previous profiles, i.e., there exists a cycle. Thus, we
have proved that there always exists either a K-stable equilibrium or a cycle. Suppose there are
no K-stable equilibria. Given the finite number of action profiles and non-existence of K-stable
equilibria there must exists a maximal set C of action profiles such that for any a ∈ C and
a′ ∈ C there exists an improving path connecting a and a′, and no action profile in C lies on an
improving path leading to an action profile that is not in C. Such a set C is a closed cycle.
An strict K-stable equilibrium can be defined similarly. An action profile a∗ in Definition 2.1
is said to be strict K-stable equilibrium if the condition 1 is same and the condition 2 is ui(a) ≥
ui(a
∗) for all i ∈ S with at least one strict inequality. Further if K = P(N) \ φ, a∗ is a strict
strong Nash equilibrium (SSNE). In this case, for a given action profile a and a coalition S ∈ K
the set of improved action profiles I2(S, a) is defined as,
I2(S, a) = {a′|a′i = ai, ∀ i /∈ S, and ui(a′) ≥ ui(a), ∀ i ∈ S, uj(a′) > uj(a), for some j ∈ S}.
(2)
and I2(S, a) = A(S, a) \ I2(S, a). The definitions of improving path and cycles can be defined
analogously to previous case. A result similar to Theorem 2.4 holds, i.e., there always exists at
least a strict K-stable equilibrium or a closed cycle of action profiles or both. A strict K-stable
equilibrium is always a K-stable equilibrium, i.e., the set of strict K-stable equilibrium is a subset
of the set of K-stable equilibrium.
Now, we give few examples of two player game illustrating the presence of K-stable equilib-
rium and closed cycle. In particular, we allow only the coalitions of size 1, and hence a K-stable
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Example 2.5. Consider a two player game
b1 b2
a1
a2
(
(4, 3) (2, 5)
(6, 1) (3, 2)
)
.
Here (a2, b2) is the only Nash equilibrium that can be reached from all other action profiles via
improving deviations. The situation is described in Figure 1.
A directed edge (a1, b1)
{1}−−→ (a2, b1) of Figure 1 represents a deviation by player 1. The other
directed edges are similarly defined. The self loop at (a2, b2) shows that a unilateral deviation
from (a2, b2) is not possible.
Example 2.6. Consider a two player game
b1 b2 b3
a1
a2
a3
(4, 4) (0, 0) (0, 0)(0, 0) (4, 5) (1, 6)
(0, 0) (2, 5) (6, 1)
 .
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(a1, b1)
(a2, b1)
(a2, b2)
(a1, b2)
{2}{1}
{2} {1}
Figure 1: Nash equilibrium and Improving deviations
The Example 2.6 has both Nash equilibrium and closed cycle. The action profile (a1, b1) is a
Nash equilibrium and the closed cycle is given by Figure 2.
(a2, b2)
(a2, b3)
(a3, b3)
(a3, b2)
{2}
{1}{2}
{1}
Figure 2: Closed Cycle
3 Dynamic play
We consider the situation where n players play the strategic game, defined in Section 2. We
assume that the players can a priori communicate with each other and hence they can form a
coalition. Then, they jointly deviate from the current action profile to a new action profile if new
action profile is strictly beneficial for all the members of the coalition. We consider the coalition
formation over infinite horizon. At each time a coalition is randomly formed and it makes an
improving deviation from current action profile to a new action profile according to the improved
action profile sets defined by (1). That is, at new action profile the actions of the players outside
the coalition remain same as before and each player of the coalition is strictly benefited. If
there is no such improved action profile for a coalition then it does not deviate. The same thing
repeats at next stage and it continues for infinite horizon. Such deviations define a coalitional
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better-response (CBR) dynamics. We assume that the coalition formation is random and at
each time only one coalition can be formed. If there are more than one improved action profiles
for a coalition then each improved action profile can be chosen with positive probability. That
is, the CBR dynamics is stochastic. The CBR dynamics defines a Markov chain over a finite set
of action profiles A. We also assume that at each time a selected coalition makes mistake and
make a joint deviation to an action profile where all the members of selected coalition are not
strictly benefited. This happens with very small probability. Such mistakes add mutations into
CBR dynamics. These mutations add another level of stochasticity in the CBR dynamics and as
a result we have perturbed Markov chain, see e.g., [2, 3]. We are interested in the action profile
which is going to be selected by the CBR dynamics as mutations vanish. We next describe the
stochastic CBR dynamics as discussed above.
3.1 A stochastic CBR dynamics without mistakes
At each time t = 0, 1, 2, · · · a coalition St is selected randomly with probability pSt > 0.
We assume that at each time selected coalition makes an improving deviation from current
action profile at, i.e., at time t + 1, the new action profile is at+1 ∈ I1(St, at) with probability
pI1(a
t+1|St, at) where pI1(·|St, at) is a probability distribution over finite set I1(St, at). If there
is no improving deviation for coalition St, a
t+1 = at. Let X0t denotes the action profile at time
t, then {X0t }∞t=0 is a finite Markov chain on set A. The transition law P 0 of the Markov chain
is defined as follows:
P 0(X0t+1 = a
′|X0t = a) =
∑
S∈K;I1(S,a)6=φ
pS pI1(a
′|S, a)1I1(S,a)(a
′) +
∑
S∈K;I1(S,a)=φ
pS1{a′=a}(a
′),
(3)
where 1B is an indicator function for a given set B. It is clear that the K-stable equilibria and
closed cycles are the recurrent classes of P 0. A K-stable equilibrium corresponds to an absorbing
state of P 0 and a closed cycle corresponds to a recurrent class of P 0 having more than one action
profiles.
From Example 2.6 it is clear that in general the closed cycles together with K-stable equilibria
can be present in a game. In that case the CBR dynamics need not converge. In Example 2.6
the CBR dynamics need not converge to Nash equilibrium (a1, b1) because once CBR dynamics
enter into closed cycle given in Figure 2 then it will never come out of it. The closed cycle
C = {(a2, b2), (a2, b3), (a3, b3), (a3, b2)} is a recurrent class and (a1, b1) is an absorbing state of
Markov chain P 0 corresponding to the game given in Example 2.6.
We call a game acyclic if it has no closed cycles. The acyclic games include coordination
games. There exists at least one K-stable equilibrium for acyclic games from Theorem 2.4. For
acyclic games the Markov chain defined by (3) is absorbing. Hence, from the theory of Markov
chain the CBR dynamics given in Section 3.1 will be at K-stable equilibrium in the long run no
matter from where it starts (see [19]).
3.2 A stochastic CBR dynamics with mistakes
Now, we assume that at each time t a selected coalition St makes error in making a deviation
from at and as a result it moves to an action profile where some players in the coalition St are not
strictly better off. We assume that at action profile at, coalition St makes error with probability
εf(St, a
t) ∈ (0, 1), where f(St, at) takes into account the fact that some coalitions can be more
prone to make errors than others and that some action profiles may lead to wrong choices more
often than others. The parameter ε allows us to tune the frequency of errors. Therefore, at
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time t + 1 the coalition St selects an improving deviation with probability (1− εf(St, at)). In
particular it selects at+1 ∈ I1(St, at) according to distribution pI1(·) defined above. By com-
bining the probabilities we obtain that the coalition selects at+1 ∈ I1(St, at) with probability
(1−εf(St, at))pI1(at+1|St, at) . The coalition selects a non-improving deviation with probability
εf(St, a
t). Let pI1(·|St, a
t) be a probability distribution over finite set I1(St, at), the coalition
chooses at+1 ∈ I1(St, at) with probability εf(St, at)pI1(·|St, a
t). If there is no improving devi-
ation, then with probability
(
1 − εf(St, at)
)
the coalition does not modify the action profile,
i.e., at+1 = at, and with the complementary probability selects an action profile in I1(St, at)
according to the distribution pI1(·|St, a
t). The transition law P ε of perturbed Markov chain
{Xεt }∞t=0 is defined as below:
P ε(Xεt+1 = a
′|Xεt+1 = a) =
∑
S∈K;I1(S,a)6=φ
pS
(
(1− εf(S, a))pI1(a′|S, a)1I1(S,a)(a
′)
+ εf(S, a)pI1(a
′|S, a)1I1(S,a)(a
′)
)
+
∑
S∈K;I1(S,a)=φ
pS
(
(1− εf(S, a))1{a′=a}(a′)
+ εf(S, a)pI1(a
′|S, a)1I1(S,a)(a
′)
)
, (4)
for all a, a′ ∈ A.
The perturbed Markov chain {Xεt }∞t=0 is irreducible because given nonzero errors it is possible
to reach all the action profiles starting from any action profile in a finite number of steps. It is
also aperiodic because with positive probability the state does not change. Hence, there exists a
unique stationary distribution µε for perturbed Markov chain. However, when ε = 0, there can
be several stationary distributions corresponding to different K-stable equilibria or closed cycles.
Such Markov chains are called singularly perturbed Markov chains, [2, 3]. We are interested
in the action profiles to which stationary distribution µε assigns positive probability as ε → 0.
This leads to the definition of a stochastically stable action profile.
Definition 3.1. An action profile a is stochastically stable relative to process P ε if
limε→0 µ
ε
a > 0.
We recall few definitions from Young [27]. If P ε(a′|a) > 0, a, a′ ∈ A, the one step resistance
from an action profile a to an action profile a′ 6= a is defined as the minimum number of
mistakes (mutations) that are required for the transition from a to a′ 6= a and it is denoted by
r(a, a′). From (4) it is clear that the transition from a to a′ has the probability of order ε if
a′ /∈ I1(S, a) for all S and thus has resistance 1 and is of order 1 otherwise, so has resistance
0. So, in our setting r(a, a′) ∈ {0, 1} for all a, a′ ∈ A. A zero resistance between two action
profiles corresponds to a transition with positive probability under P 0. One can view the action
profiles as the nodes of a directed graph that has no self loops and the weight of a directed edge
between two different nodes is represented by one step resistance between them. Since P ε is
an irreducible Markov chain then there must exist at least one directed path between any two
recurrent classes Hi and Hj of P
0 which starts from Hi and ends at Hj . The resistance of any
path is defined as the sum of the weights of the corresponding edges. The resistance of a path
which is minimum among all paths from Hi to Hj is called as resistance from Hi to Hj and it
is denoted by rij . The resistance from any action profile a
i ∈ Hi to any action profile aj ∈ Hj is
rij because inside Hi and Hj action profiles are connected with a path of zero resistance. Now
we recall the definition of stochastic potential of a recurrent class Hi of P
0 from [27]. It can
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be computed by restricting to a reduced graph. Construct a graph G where total number of
nodes are the number of recurrent classes of P 0(one action profile from each recurrent class)
and a directed edge from ai to aj is weighted by rij . Take a node a
i ∈ G and consider all the
spanning trees such that from every node aj ∈ G, aj 6= ai, there is a unique path directed from
aj to ai. Such spanning trees are called ai-trees. The resistance of an ai-tree is the sum of
the resistances of its edges. The stochastic potential of ai is the resistance of an ai-tree having
minimum resistance among all ai-trees. The stochastic potential of each node in Hi is same and
it is a stochastic potential of Hi [27].
Theorem 3.2. For the stochastic CBR dynamics defined in Section 3.2, all K-stable equilib-
ria and all the action profiles from closed cycles, that have minimum stochastic potential, are
stochastically stable. Furthermore, if one action profile in a closed cycle is stochastically stable
then all the action profiles in the closed cycle are stochastically stable.
Proof. We know that the Markov chain P ε is aperiodic and irreducible. From (3) and (4) it is
easy to see that
lim
ε→0
P ε(a′|a) = P 0(a′|a), ∀ a, a′ ∈ A.
From (4) it is clear that, if P ε(a′|a) > 0 for some ε ∈ (0, ε0], then we have
0 < ε−r(a,a
′)P ε(a′|a) <∞.
Markov chain P ε satisfies all three required conditions of Theorem 4 in [27] from which it
follows that as ε → 0, µε converges to a stationary distribution µ0 of P 0 and an action profile
a is stochastically stable, i.e., µ0a > 0, if and only if a is contained in a recurrent class of P
0
having minimum stochastic potential. We know that the recurrent classes of Markov chain P 0
are K-stable equilibria or closed cycles. Therefore, all the K-stable equilibria and the action
profiles from closed cycles having minimum stochastic potential are stochastically stable. The
proof of last part follows from the fact that the stochastic potential of each action profile in a
closed cycle is the same.
Remark 3.3. The stochastic stability results do not depend on the function f(·) or the distri-
butions of pI1(·), pI1(·) and p = (pS)S∈K.
Corollary 3.4. If K = P(N) \ φ, all strong Nash equilibria and all action profiles from closed
cycles are stochastically stable for the stochastic CBR dynamics defined in Section 3.2.
Proof. If K = P(N)\φ, all the strong Nash equilibria and closed cycles are the recurrent classes
of P 0. Now, it is always possible to reach one action profile from another action profile by at
most one error due to the formation of grand coalition. Then, the resistance rij between any
two distinct recurrent classes Hi and Hj is always 1. Hence, the stochastic potential of each
recurrent class of P 0 is J − 1, where J is the number of recurrent classes of P 0. In fact, a
spanning tree in graph G includes only J − 1 links and each of them has resistance 1. The proof
then follows from Theorem 3.2.
We can have a similar CBR dynamics without mistakes and with mistakes as given in Sections
3.1 and 3.2 respectively, if for all S ∈ K and a ∈ A the set of improved action profiles is I2(S, a)
defined by (2). We have the following results.
Theorem 3.5. For a stochastic CBR dynamics corresponding to improved action profile sets
defined by (2), all strict K-stable equilibria and all the action profiles from closed cycles, that have
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minimum stochastic potential, are stochastically stable. Furthermore, if one action profile in a
closed cycle is stochastically stable then all the action profiles in the closed cycle are stochastically
stable.
Proof. The proof follows from the similar arguments given in Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.6. If K = P(N) \ φ, all strict strong Nash equilibria and all action profiles from
closed cycles are stochastically stable for the stochastic CBR dynamics corresponding to improved
action profile sets defined by (2).
Proof. The proof follows from the similar arguments given in Corollary 3.4.
3.2.1 Equilibrium selection in coordination games
First we consider a 2 × 2 coordination game and discuss which Nash equilibrium is selected,
by CBR dynamics defined in Section 3.2, in the long run when probability of making mistakes
vanish. Our equilibrium selection results in 2×2 coordination games are different from the results
given in [18],[27]. We first consider the case where only the coalitions of size 1 are formed. In
this case, a K-stable equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. Consider a 2× 2 coordination game,
s1 s2
s1
s2
(a11, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a22, b22)
,
where ajk, bjk ∈ R, j, k ∈ {1, 2} and a11 > a21, b11 > b12, a22 > a12, b22 > b21. Ai = {s1, s2},
i = 1, 2. Here (s1, s1) and (s2, s2) are two Nash equilibria. In this game there are two types of
Nash equilibria one is payoff dominant and other one is risk dominant. If a11 > a22, b11 > b22,
then (s1, s1) is payoff dominant and if a11 < a22, b11 < b22, then (s2, s2) is payoff dominant. In
other cases payoff dominant Nash equilibrium does not exist. From [27], define,
R1 = min
{
a11 − a21
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
,
b11 − b12
b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
}
,
R2 = min
{
a22 − a12
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
,
b22 − b21
b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
}
.
If R1 > R2, then (s1, s1) is risk dominant Nash equilibrium and if R2 > R1, then (s2, s2) is risk
dominant Nash equilibrium.
The state space of Markov chain is {(s1, s1), (s1, s2), (s2, s1), (s2, s2)}, where (s1, s1) and
(s2, s2) are the absorbing states of Markov chain P
0. From Remark 3.3, the stochastic stability
results do not depend on the distributions of pI1(·), pI1(·) and p = (pS)S∈K and function f(·).
Therefore, we assume that all the distributions are uniform and function f(·) has constant
value 1. Under this assumption, the transition probability matrix of perturbed Markov chain is
P ε =

1− ε2
ε
4
ε
4 0
1−ε
2 ε 0
1−ε
2
1−ε
2 0 ε
1−ε
2
0 ε4
ε
4 1−
ε
2
 .
The unique stationary distribution of P ε is µε =
(
1−ε
2−ε ,
ε
2(2−ε) ,
ε
2(2−ε) ,
1−ε
2−ε
)
. As ε → 0,
µε → (12 , 0, 0,
1
2). That is, both the Nash equilibria are stochastically stable. This happens
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because we require only 1 mutation to reach from one Nash equilibrium to another Nash equi-
librium. Therefore, the resistance from one Nash equilibrium to another Nash equilibrium is
1. Then, the stochastic potential of both the Nash equilibria will be 1. For the case when all
types of coalitions can be formed the CBR dynamics always selects a payoff dominant Nash
equilibrium whenever it exists because it is an SNE. When payoff dominant Nash equilibrium
does not exist then both the Nash equilibria are strong Nash equilibria and in that case CBR
dynamics selects both the Nash equilibria. The stochastic dynamics by Young [27] and Kandori
et al. [18] always select a risk dominant Nash equilibrium.
Among symmetric coordination games if we go beyond 2 × 2 matrix games the result by
Young [27] cannot be generalized, i.e., it need not select a risk dominant Nash equilibrium.
Consider an example of 3× 3 matrix game from [27],
s1 s2 s3
s1
s2
s3

(6, 6) (0, 5) (0, 0)
(5, 0) (7, 7) (5, 5)
(0, 0) (5, 5) (8, 8)
.
Here (s1, s1), (s2, s2) and (s3, s3) are three Nash equilibria. The stochastic dynamics by Young
[27] selects (s2, s2) that is not a risk dominant Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium of an m×m
symmetric coordination game is risk dominant if it is risk dominant in all pairwise contest (see
[12]). We now discuss the equilibrium selection by CBR dynamics in above 3 × 3 coordination
game. We first consider the case where only the coalitions of size 1 are formed. The state space
of Markov chain is {(s1, s1), (s1, s2), (s1, s3), (s2, s1), (s2, s2), (s2, s3), (s3, s1), (s3, s2), (s3, s3)},
where (s1, s1), (s2, s2), and (s3, s3) are absorbing states of Markov chain P
0. We label the
states (s1, s1) as 1, (s2, s2) as 2 and (s3, s3) as 3. Then, the resistance from (s1, s1) to (s2, s2) is
denoted by r12, where r12 = 1. Similarly, r13 = 2, r31 = 2, r21 = 1, r23 = 1, r32 = 1. There are
three 1-trees as given below.
1 2
3
1
1
1 2
3
1
2
1 3
2
2
1
Figure 3: 1-trees
The minimum resistance of a 1-tree among all 1-trees is 2. Hence, the stochastic potential
of (s1, s1) is 2. Similarly, by constructing 2-trees and 3-trees we can calculate the stochastic
potential of (s2, s2) and (s3, s3). The stochastic potential of (s2, s2) and (s3, s3) is also 2. Hence,
all the Nash equilibria are stochastically stable from Theorem 3.2. For the case where there is
no restriction in coalition formation, CBR dynamics selects (s3, s3) because it is a strong Nash
equilibrium.
3.2.2 Application to network formation games
Network formation games are nowadays a consolidated branch of game theory [5, 6, 13]. A
network formation game can be viewed as the link formation game given in [7]. A pairwise
stable network [17] is induced by a strategy profile which is a K-stable equilibrium, where K is
a set of all single player coalitions and all the coalitions of size 2, in the link formation game.
In general, the networks which are stable against the deviations of all the coalitions are called
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strongly stable networks. In the literature, there are two definitions of strongly stable networks.
The first definition is due to Dutta and Mutuswami [7] in which a strongly stable network is
induced by a strategy profile that is an SNE in the link formation game. The second definition
is due to Jackson and van den Nouweland [14] in which a strongly stable network is induced by
a strategy profile that is an SSNE in the link formation game. Under the stochastic dynamics
given by Jackson and Watts [16] a pairwise stable or a network belonging to a closed cycle is a
stochastically stable network if its stochastic potential is minimum among all the networks. This
result follows from Theorem 3.5 if K is a set of all single player coalitions and all the coalitions
of size 2. It follows from Corollary 3.4 and Corollary 3.6 that under stochastic CBR dynamics
all strongly stable networks and closed cycles of networks are stochastically stable.
4 Conclusions
We introduce coalition formation among players in an n-player strategic game over infinite
horizon and propose a CBR dynamics. The mutations are present in the dynamics due to
erroneous decisions taken by the coalitions. We show that all K-stable equilibria and all action
profiles from closed cycles, that have minimum stochastic potential, are stochastically stable.
Similar development holds for strict K-stable equilibrium. When there is no restriction on
coalition formation, all SNE and closed cycles are stochastically stable. Similar development
holds for SSNE.
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